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Cambridge and and Co-Editor of BriefingsForBrexit 
Understandably we have heard little recently from Remainers or the 
second referendum brigade. As the football fans chant “they’ve all 
gone quiet over there”.  Right from 10pm on election night when an 
accurate forecast announced Boris Johnson’s stunning victory the 
opponents of Brexit have been too shocked to say much. 
This quiescence is unlikely to last. Already we hear confident 
predictions that a comprehensive free trade agreement cannot be 
negotiated within the now legally-binding 12 months allowed for doing 
the deal. Even after a deal we can expect the hard-line Remainers to 
become Rejoiners. Like the Jacobites of the 18th century, resistance 
may continue long after all is lost. 
Once Boris Johnson’s Withdrawal Bill has completed its House of 
Lord’s formalities and become an Act there will be nothing preventing 
the UK from leaving the EU at 11pm on the last day of this month. 
After all of the opposition from parliament and the courts in 2019 it 
feels a bit like a ship entering sheltered waters after a particularly 
rough passage, but are the waters really as smooth as they 
temporarily seem? 
The Withdrawal Agreement was certainly not as good as it could and 
should have been. By the end of last September, the UK was 
negotiating with one hand tied behind its back once the Benn Act 
outlawed any possibility of an exit from the EU on WTO terms alone. 
Since the UK had then to make an agreement with the EU in order 
to  leave, the EU could have dictated whatever terms it wished. 
By this late in what had become to look like interminable talks even 
the EU wanted to bring things to end. By that stage it was in any case 
obvious that the EU had got much of what it needed. The financial 
settlement from Theresa May’s earlier flawed agreement was carried 
forward. Similarly, the agreement on the treatment of EU citizens was 
included in a revised deal. 
The changes from the May deal to Johnson’s Agreement amounted to 
only a few pages but crucially they removed the hated stipulation that 
the UK remain in the EU customs union and in alignment with EU 
regulations until the EU agreed some alternative arrangements 
satisfactory to themselves. 
In fact, the EU was happy to drop these since they had come from 
May not itself. The EU’s preferred option had all along been to keep 
only Northern Ireland inside the customs union and aligned to EU 
regulations. 
In the rushed last few days before the latest extension expired on 
October 31st 2019, a new deal was done which essentially did keep 
Northern Ireland harnessed in this way. To prevent any land border in 
Ireland it was agreed that a border of sorts would be set up in the Irish 
Sea between Northern Ireland and GB. Any tariffs payable for exports 
from the UK to Ireland via Northern Ireland would be paid before 
entering Northern Ireland. 
Goods liable to be involved in the production of exports from Northern 
Ireland to the EU would also be liable for tariffs. More significantly any 
sectors in Northern Ireland which produced goods which could 
potentially be exported to the EU would need to observe EU rules. 
The scope of these restrictions would be determined by the new Joint 
Committee set up in association with the Withdrawal Agreement and 
disputes would be adjudicated by the European Court of Justice. The 
writ of the Joint Committee ran as far determining limits for agricultural 
subsidies in Northern Ireland and a need for Irish vets to check 
standards of food production. 
All of this occurred after Boris Johnson had earlier received a 
rapturous reception at the DUP annual conference for promising no 
border in the Irish Sea. It became clear that in its rush Government 
Minsters did not know what had been agreed. DExEU Minister 
Stephen Barclay had to correct himself when he told a Commons 
Select Committee that there would be no checks on goods passing 
from Northern Ireland to GB. 
In fact, under the EU’s Union Customs Code, export declarations are 
needed. Whether this meets the Withdrawal Agreement’s clear 
stipulation that goods from Northern Ireland should have ‘unfettered 
access’ to GB is a moot point. 
The DUP and the wider unionist community in Northern Ireland not 
surprisingly felt betrayed. Large public meetings of loyalists were 
reminiscent of those that greeted the signing of the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement in 1985. Not-so-veiled threats of loyalist violence began to 
be heard. These mirrored earlier threats of republican violence which 
had unwisely been aired by Tony Blair, John Major and other 
supporters of Remain. 
Some advisors in Number 10 were said to be distressed at what had 
been hurriedly agreed. Johnson himself told one MP that he believed 
that the DUP had backed the deal, something which was to say the 
least highly improbable. 
The PM has responded to the DUP’s distress by asserting that there 
will be no checks in the Irish Sea. These assertions are widely viewed 
as not credible but there is much that can be done. Firstly, it is highly 
likely that a free trade agreement will be in place before the end of the 
transition period at October 31st 2020. 
This may not be the full and final agreement on commercial relations 
with the EU, but it should at least cover tariff-free trade in goods with 
no quotas. 
This will be enough to remove the need for most tariff checks at the 
Irish Sea or indeed any UK border with the EU. Johnson is surely also 
correct to say that there will be no need for Northern Ireland firms to 
complete export declarations on sales to GB. 
Checks may still be needed at ports in Northern Ireland and GB on 
trade with Ireland flowing through Northern Ireland, but this is hardly a 
matter of constitutional importance. 
The issue of regulatory alignment in Northern Ireland remains, but 
applies only to goods exportable to the EU and these will be needed 
to observe EU regulations anyway. It is clear that much detailed 
negotiation remains to be done but to quote T S Eliot, Brexit in 
Northern Ireland may end ‘not with a bang but a whimper’. 
 
